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Abstract—Future railway systems should bring convenience to
people’s lives. In fact, due to the move away from bespoke stand-
alone systems to open-platform, standardized equipments and
increasing use of networked control and automation systems and
connected technologies, the efficiency and the safety of railway
services are improving. However, this dependence of automation,
control and communication technologies makes railway systems
becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks and security
threats which affects the overall performance. This paper deals
with cybersecurity concerns facing these systems. As such, we
analyse characteristics of railway threat landscape. Then, we
discuss the direct impacts of the identified potential threats and
their consequences on the whole system and we evaluate resulted
risks. For space limitation, we choose to present the impact,
likelihood and risk analysis for one functionality of the system,
namely External Door control (EDC). Some good practices and
related techniques for the development of safer, more comfortable,
and more secure future railway systems are also discussed.
Index Terms—TCMS, Cyber-Physical Security, Risk Assess-
ment, Threat, Vulnerability, ISA/IEC 62443
I. INTRODUCTION
The Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS) is the
main part of the control system of a train. It provides a control
and monitoring infrastructure that enhances train operations
and increases its safety and reliability. The integration of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTS) into
the TCMS will improve efficiency of the railway rolling
stock industry as it enables the implementation of innovative
solutions, services and applications in the quest for smarter,
safer and more efficient railway transportation systems. The
new generation of trains will use real-time rail information
and online environmental data in combination with on-board
references to achieve optimal control of the train traction
and braking while keeping with travel schedule and reducing
energy consumption. Likewise, train passengers travelling ex-
perience will be improved through services such as connected
infotainment, real-time information, etc.
Nevertheless, the process of increasing the incorporation
of ICTS into railway systems presents a growing dilemma.
On one hand, this innovation has become an urgent need to
maintain a competitive edge comparing to other transportation
systems. On the other hand, the introduction of networked
devices, remote access and control capabilities, especially with
the emergence of wireless communication systems as alterna-
tives to supplant wired systems in the railway industry, all acts
to increase the system exposure to cyber-threats. While cyber-
technology is complex and fast evolving, cyber-attacks are
also becoming increasingly automated and sophisticated. Their
impact on critical infrastructures in particular railway systems,
can lead to catastrophic consequences, no matter whether they
are the intended target or not. Attacks on operational systems
could lead to the disruption or the unavailability of the rail
transport itself. When informational systems are attacked it
can lead to the unavailability of services for the passenger,
like being unable to buy a ticket or digitally check a ticket into
the system. Consequently, cyber-attacks on the transportation
sector create a large impact on society and people’s daily life
varying from direct effects such as delays, accidents, injuries or
even deaths, to indirect effects, such as socio-economic effects.
The work presented in this paper is conducted within the Eu-
ropean project ROLL2RAIL under the task security for TCMS
that aims to identify convenient security countermeasures and
to define required protection levels of TCMS assets. Yet, such
outcomes can be accomplished using a coherent and strate-
gic approach that encompasses all cybersecurity aspects. In
ROLL2RAIL, the selected approach is defined by the standard
ISA/IEC-62443 [1]. Due to space limitation, in this paper,
we present the cyber-physical security risk assessment of one
functionality of TCMS, namely the external door control. This
analysis aims to identify system threats, quantify impacts and
expected losses. The proposed countermeasures and mitigation
techniques are not presented because they are classified.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II shortly introduces the methodology selected to establish
a security risk assessment for TCMSS. Then, in section III, we
identify the System under Consideration (SUC) for the security
risk assessment. Next, in section IV, railway threat landscape
is discussed through threat and vulnerability assessments. In
section V, we present an impact, likelihood and risk analysis
of potential threats against the SUC. Finally, in section VI, we
review some good practices to be used in transportation system
in order to minimise the identified risks.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Traditional information systems security is usually based
on CIA principle, standing for Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability by priority order. However, for Industrial Au-
tomation Control System (IACS) such as TCMS, the priority
is generally reversed depending on the specificities of the
considered system. For railway systems, the most important
aspect is the train movement, for that, security concern is first
integrity, then availability and finally confidentiality. In fact,
loss of integrity could lead to accidents or collisions, whereas
loss of availability would bring the railway system to a halt.
Loss of confidentiality is less of an immediate threat, but might
result in the leak of sensitive operational information. As such,
standards and methodologies developed for traditional infor-
mation technology systems cannot be applied directly. This
issue has received attention not only from researchers, but also
from public authorities and standard committees during the last
few years. Thereby, several information security standards have
been proposed to address security issues for the particular case
of IACS such as ISO/IEC 27000 [2], ISO/IEC 15408 Common
Criteria [3], ISA/IEC 62443 [1], EN 50159 [4], RFC 2196 [5],
ETSI TS 102 165 [6], German standards like DIN VDE V
0831-102 [7] and DIN VDE V 0831-104 [8], US standards
like FIPS PUB 199 [9], FIPS PUB 200 [10] and NIST Special
Publications (SP) like SP 800-37 [11], SP 800-53 rev. 4 [12],
etc. An extensive study on Security standards and guidelines
for IACS is available in [13]. From these security standards,
ISA/IEC 62443 is considered as the most important one for
ROLL2RAIL project. The ISA99 committee, which is respon-
sible for generating the specifications, has made great efforts to
bring together numerous standards and recommendations that
exist and then to create a comprehensive set of documents that
is consistent and broadly applicable in virtually any industrial
sector. This and the fact that these specifications have now
been recognized by industry worldwide through simultaneous
adoption by the IEC give the ISA/IEC 62443 series a strong
chance to be a single definitive set of international standards
for IACS cybersecurity. This is also testified by the fact that
it is recognized as pivotal security standard for Industry 4.0
project[14] and that it will be adopted by CENELEC [15].
The standard ISA/IEC-62443 [1] provides guidance to im-
prove electronic security and help reducing the risk of com-
promising confidential information or causing degradation or
failure of the equipment (hardware and software) of systems
under control. Thereby, ISA/IEC-62443 improves the avail-
ability, integrity and confidentiality of components or systems
used for industrial automation and control, thus it enables the
implementation of secure IACS.
The security risk assessment methodology proposed by
ISA/IEC-62443 is composed of 13 steps, as presented in Fig. 1.
The identification of the SUC is the first step of the methodol-
ogy. It consists of a functional and design specification phase
that aims to identify physical and Information Technology
(IT) assets of the system. Step 2 and 3 address the system
threat landscape through threat and vulnerability assessments.
Once potential threats and system vulnerabilities are identified,
their direct impacts and cascading consequences on the whole
system should be studied in step 4. Then, the likelihood of
each identified threat should be determined in step 5. Step
6 consists of the calculation of the unmitigated risk in a
risk matrix using determined likelihood and impact levels. In
step 7, the risk created by each identified threat should be
evaluated based on the risk matrix. In step 8, countermeasures
should be identified to mitigate risks evaluated unacceptable.
Then, likelihoods and risks should be re-evaluated in order
to measure the effectiveness of proposed solutions. In case
some risks are still evaluated unacceptable, a set of additional
countermeasures should be proposed and then step 9 and
10 should be repeated until all risks become acceptable. At
the end, the security risk assessment should be closed by a
documentation phase.
In this paper, we present the security risk assessment of
EDC functionality based on the IEC 62443 methodology.
III. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we present the system under consideration
for the security risk assessment.
A. Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS)
The TCMS of a train is mainly responsible for providing
basic train control functions, such as inaugurating the train
Start of the security risk assessment
Step 1:
System Identification List of SuC assets
Threat information sources
(e.g. historical data)
Step 2:
Threat Assessment
List of potential
threats against the
SuC
previous Vulnerability
assessment, databases
etc.
Step 3:
Vulnerability
Assessment
List of vulnerabili-
ties of the SuC
Threats, vulnerability
assessments
Step 4:
Consequence and
impact determination
Assessment of
impacts
Lists of threats and
vulnerabilities
Step 5:
Unmitigated likelihood
determination
Assessment of
likelihoods
Attacks potential, likeli-
hoods, impacts and risk
matrix
Step 6:
Unmitigated security
risk calculation
Unmitigated
security risk
risk matrix with tolerable
risk
Step 7:
Risk evaluation
Unmitigated secu-
rity risk evaluated
Step 8:
identification of
countermeasures
List of countermea-
sures
List of applied counter-
measures
Step 9:
Likelihood and
impact re-evaluation
Updated likelihood
and impact assess-
ment
Updated likelihoods,
impacts and risk matrix
Step 10:
Residual security
risk calculation
Residual security
risk
Are all residual
risks bellow or at
tolerable level?
Step 11:
Application
of additional
countermeasures
Step 12:
Documentation and
communication
of the results
Detailed risk
assessment report
End of the security risk assessment
No
yes
T
H
R
E
AT
LA
N
D
S
C
A
P
E
IM
PA
C
T
S
,L
IK
E
LI
H
O
O
D
A
N
D
R
IS
K
A
N
A
LY
S
IS
Fig. 1: ISA/IEC-62443 security risk assessment methodology
network, determining train topology and configuration, pro-
viding orientation information for coupled elements, manag-
ing leading vehicle information, distributing train topology
and configuration, confirming train configuration, managing
train network operation, managing train network access and
transmitting data. Nevertheless, with the integration of ad-
vanced ICT in the railway industry, the TCMS is expected
to manage a set of sophisticated applications not only for
a more reliable train control, but also for operator oriented
services and customer comfort purposes. For operational and
security purposes, control system ICT should be separated
from comfort ICT, as such the TCMS is clustered into 3
functional domains [16][17][18][19]:
∙ Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS) domain
includes both safety related and non-safety related TCMS
functions. The functions of this domain are mandatory to
ensure safe train movement and to ensure carrying the payload,
such as : main control, train radio, air conditioning, propulsion,
brakes, electricity, lavatories, lighting, supporting systems,
passenger announcement system, external doors and internal
doors, European Train Control System (ETCS), Automatic
Fig. 2: SUC functional domains based model[16]
Train Protection (ATP), On-board Driving Data Recording
System (ODDRS), passenger alarm system and Closed-circuit
television (CCTV) for rear view purposes.
∙ Operator Oriented Services (OOS) domain is where all
auxiliary services for proper train operation are considered,
such as : priority logic, CCTV for video surveillance purposes,
infotainment in train embedded devices, mobile phone am-
plifiers, automatic passenger counting,vehicle positioning, fare
management or ticketing, driver assistance system, E-schedule,
diagnostics and Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) systems
and Passenger Information System (PIS) (including automatic
announcements).
∙ Customer Oriented Services (COS) domain includes the
functions executed by passenger devices such as: access for
the passenger’s devices (e.g. Wi-Fi access points), Access to
the public internet and passenger info-portal.
This three-level modelization, presented in Fig. 2, aims to
increase the system flexibility, scalability, and adaptability for
future evolutions.
To accomplish all functionalities mentioned above, system
actors and devices need to exchange data and commands using
communication networks in different communication schemes
such as intra-train, train-to-train and train-to-ground commu-
nications. Communication networks for future railway systems
are expected to be heterogeneous composed of a mixture of
several networks and radio access technologies that can be
simultaneously accessed by different system actors and devices
in order to improve the capacity for communications. For
instance, ROLL2RAIL proposes the use of an heterogeneous
network architecture combining wireless technologies, such
cellular network like LTE, IEEE 802.11, RFID and wired
networks where the advantages and specificities of each access
network can be taken into consideration [17]. For safety and
security purposes, access between different domains will be
limited. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2, the proposed architecture
includes also additional network protection devices between
different functional domains.
B. External Door control function
Due to space limitation, in this paper, we focus on presenting
impact, likelihood and risk evaluation (from step 4 to step 7 in
the risk assessment methodology) only for EDC system from
TCMS domain. As such, in this section, we provide a detailed
description of EDC system.
Based on IEC-61375 Standard [20], a distributed train
functionality is accomplished using several function interfaces
installed within the train in an hierarchical way aiming to
remotely control processes.
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∙ one Function Leader (FL) which is responsible to control
the function by stimulation of the Function Followers (FFs)
(sending commands) and to receive the reactions from the FFs
(receiving status);
∙ one or more Function Follower(s) (FF), at most one per
consist network, which is responsible to receive the commands
from the FL and to stimulate the Function Devices (FDs). The
received reactions from the FDs are cumulated by the FF and
provided as function status of the consist to the FL;
∙ one or more Function Device(s) (FD), which are receiving
the commands from the FF, execute the function operations
and report the results to the FF.
These parts of the application are distributed over the consists
of the train. Different parts of the application in different
consists can communicate only via the Train Control Network
(TCN).
Likewise, EDC, being a distributed train application, has the
same architecture defined above. As presented in Figure 3, the
EDC system is controlled by the TCMS through interfaces
provided by the Train Door Control Unit (DCU). The Train
DCU is then the function leader, it is the controlling part for all
doors in the train. The Consist DCU is the function follower,
it is the agent for one consist. The DCU is the function device,
it is responsible for the physical door. The Door is the physical
device dedicated to the DCU. In addition to automatic control
interfaces, EDC system parts can be manipulated manually
using crew interfaces for maintenance purposes or in case of
malfunctioning problems.
IV. RAILWAY THREAT LANDSCAPE
A. Threat Assessment
In this section, we study potential threats against TCMS and
their characteristics. As such, we present a threat taxonomy that
covers mainly cybersecurity threats; which are threats directly
applied to ICT assets and thus affecting TCMS operations. We
also present non-IT threats to cover threats to TCMS physical
assets that are necessary for the system operation. Based on
several recent studies published by European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [21][22][23],
we identify potential threats against TCMS. These threats can
be classified into the following categories:
∙ Physical attacks. This type of threats is caused by intentional
offensive actions aiming to achieve maximum distraction, dis-
ruption, destruction, exposure, alteration, theft or unauthorized
accessing of assets such as hardware or ICT connections.
∙ Unintentional damages. These are caused by accidental
insider actions[24] including human errors[25]. Unintentional
mistakes can be made by authorized employees, users, devel-
opers, and testers during data entry, operations, or application
development. Such errors can affect the system integrity and
stability .
∙ Outages and disasters. This category contains unexpected
disruption of services due to outages and disasters including
natural and environmental disasters not triggered by human.
∙ Failure and malfunctions. This category covers unexpected
failure or disruptions of devices or systems including hardware,
software and ICT connexions failure or malfunctioning.
∙ Eavesdropping/Interception/Hijacking. This type of threats
contains cyber-attacks and intentional malicious activities or
abuse targeting digital assets of a system. Threats from this cat-
egory consists of altering communication between two parties.
These attacks do not have to install additional tools/software
on a victim’s site.
∙ Nefarious activities. This category also contains cyber-
attacks and intentional malicious activities or abuse targeting
digital assets of a system. However, attacks belonging to this
category usually require the use of tools by the attacker. As
such, the threat is accomplished through the installation of
additional tools/software or performing additional steps on the
victim’s IT infrastructure/ software.
The identified threats can be conducted by several types of
actors with different motivations. They can be :
∙ Nation states targeting other nations critical infrastructures,
including railway systems. In fact, these systems provide es-
sential services for a nation’s society and serve as the backbone
of its economy, security, and health. As such, they become a
significant target in modern cyber-warfare. Attacks performed
by such actors can be politically or economically motivated.
∙ Non-state organized threat groups including cyber-
terrorists, cyber-fighters and cyber-criminals. Common to all
these threat actors is that they can be organized on local,
national or international level. However, their motivations and
skill level vary. Cyber-terrorists have political or religious mo-
tivations and their capability varies from low to high. Whereas,
cyber-fighters are patriotic motivated groups of citizens with
strong feelings when their political, national or religious values
seem to be threatened by another group and are capable of
launching cyber-attack to protest and . Cyber-criminals are
organized groups with quite high skill level that attack systems
for financial gain.
∙ Insider threat agents including employees (staff, contrac-
tors, operational staff) and third party (vendors, system integra-
tors, and other third party service and product providers) are
considered as dangerous threat actors since they have insider
access to private facilities and resources and a significant
amount of knowledge that allows them to place effective
attacks against sensitive parts of the system.
∙ Hacktivists who are attackers, in many cases with limited
technical skills, but rely on ready-to-use attack kits and ser-
vices, or even third-party botnets, to cause damage to a system
e.g., denial of service, defacement as a means of protest. Their
protests are often politically motivated.
∙ Business-oriented attackers interested in performing abu-
sive activities against competitor-controlled cyber-physical sys-
tems in order to cause concrete damage and gain business
advantages.
∙ Casual cyber-attackers with little or no technical skills,
launching attacks against connected systems and causing seri-
ous damage, especially when it comes to connected control
systems. It is important to note that individual non state
attackers (such as hacktivists, business-oriented attackers and
casual attackers) could also be considered by nation states as
allies in a low intensity warfare against an opponent nation.
The aforementioned actors are driven by several categories
of motivations. We identify two main motivations:
∙ Political purposes. Since railway systems are part of a
nation critical infrastructure, attacking them is considered as a
strategical warfare weapon that may cause severe consequences
varying from endangering people lives to financial loss and
economical impacts. As these systems become increasingly
reliant on ICT, they merge as a important target for political
motivated cyber attacks. These warefare strategies are already
used and they have been multiplied in the few past years.
They can be used to cause physical damage or exfiltrating
intelligence or secret information. Some well-publicized ex-
ample is the attack conducted on Iranian Nuclear Facilities by
using the worm Stuxnet[26]. According to [27], Stuxnet was
launched by the US and Israel several years ago, in an attempt
to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. Actors such as nation states
and hacktivists fall in this category.
∙ Financial purposes. Transportation systems, including rail-
way systems, are the backbone of national economies, pro-
viding connections for people and goods, access to jobs and
services, and enabling trade and economic growth. Attacking
such systems results in financial loss to the service providers,
but also cascading consequences on other domains. At railway
operator level, attacks can be financially motivated in order
to cause business disruption and sales loss. This can cause
significant long-term economic impact when reputation of the
operators and trust of customers are impacted[28]. Financial
motivated attacks are usually performed by business-oriented
actors, but also by nation states actors driven by economic
reasons. This category of motivation also existed before critical
infrastructures became an appealing and sensitive target.
B. Vulnerability Assessment
The integration of cyber-physical systems into critical in-
frastructures brings not only benefits but also a new set of
vulnerabilities for the whole system. The exploitation of such
cyber-vulnerabilities can lead to physical consequences. Based
on [23], we identify vulnerabilities of railway systems. These
vulnerabilities are divided in two categories:
1- General vulnerabilities for IACS
∙ Wireless and cellular communications. Although such com-
munication technologies brings several advantages to the sys-
tem, they introduce typical vulnerabilities because communi-
cations take place ’through the air’ using radio frequencies and
thus it is difficult to prevent physical access to them, especially
in open and accessible areas like public railway infrastructure.
Risk of attacks such as interception and intrusion is greater
than with wired networks.
∙ Increasing system automation. Although automation control
improves safety and global system operations by removing
possibility of human error, it introduces new vulnerabilities
since the surface of attacks increases and therefore risk of
attacks increases.
2- Specific vulnerabilities for railway use case
∙ Scale and complexity of railway systems. Railway infras-
tructure is a large-scale international infrastructure. Applying
networked technologies across large railway systems increases
number of access points to the system, and thus increases
the difficulty and cost. Thereby, securing communications
and connectivity between mobile devices on large area is a
complicated task.
∙ Cohabitation between legacy and new systems. Since rail-
way infrastructure is a shared common infrastructure used by
different railway companies, the use of legacy equipments and
infrastructures introduces new vulnerabilities.
∙ Multiple independent systems. In addition to legacy prob-
lems, railway systems are composed of diverse systems such as
sensors, computers, payment systems, emergency systems. It is
crucial, but difficult, to ensure smooth interfacing, communica-
tion and securing between such independent and heterogeneous
systems. This increases vulnerabilities.
∙ Access to real-time data. Reliable operation of the system
requires a non-stop real-time data exchange which may result
in costly maintenance and periods of service downtime.
∙ Online passenger services such as timetabling, passenger
information, ticket booking, are also susceptible to cyber
attacks.
V. IMPACTS, LIKELIHOOD AND RISK ANALYSIS
A. Impacts and Consequences Determination
A risk [29] is the potential that a given threat will success-
fully exploit vulnerabilities and thereby produce a negative
impact on the system such as confidentiality and privacy
problems for the passengers (since the system uses sensing,
tracking, real-time behaviour evaluation and automated deci-
sions), interruption and disturbance of transport services which,
in addition to dissatisfaction of passengers and disruption of
their daily lives, can have secondary consequences on other
sectors, loss of revenue, reputation and customers trust, etc[23].
However, the most critical impact is when passengers health
and safety are affected. In fact, passengers safety is the priority
to all railway systems actors, nonetheless, some incidents may
endanger health and safety, not to mention threats coming from
terrorism that need to be accounted for when protecting railway
systems and infrastructure.
In this step, we investigate impacts of potential threats
identified in section IV-A. Table I studies, for each threat,
direct impacts and unwanted incidents created on the attacked
component and the cascading consequences on the EDC.
The identified impacts can affect one or many areas. We
distinguish 3 categories of risk based on the impacted area [30]:
safety, financial and operational risks. For each category, we
define 3 levels of severity. Regarding the impact determination,
we used the method presented in [31] with some modifications.
According to [31], the consequences in each of category are
ranked, as shown in Table II, according to their severity level.
Decimal power scaling was used for the rating of the severity of
consequences assigning them the impact value to distinguish
between the severity of consequences both within each area
and between areas.
The total impact is calculated as follows:
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 +𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙+𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙
(1)
For evaluating the impact, we use a qualitative scale, presented
in Table III, taken from [31].
B. Unmitigated likelihood determination
The calculation of the likelihood is a major challenge, it is
usually accomplished using the Attack Potential (AP) calcu-
lation method specified by the standardized method Common
Criteria [32] which is also used by the ETSI TVRA [33] and
in the risk analysis approach described in [31]. Following this
approach, the attack likelihood is determined in two steps:
first, determining the AP and then, mapping of the AP to a
likelihood. Determining the AP consists of measuring the effort
required to mount a successful attack against the considered
system. It is assumed that the higher is the AP the lower will be
the likelihood of a successful attack. The factors considered in
the identification the AP and their ranges and values are listed
in Table IV (based on [32]).
Then, the accumulated attack potential is calculated as
follows:
𝐴𝑃 = 𝐴𝑃𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝐴𝑃𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒+𝐴𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠+𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
(2)
After AP calculation step, we move to AP/likelihood mapping
step. To this end, five levels are defined to rate the calculated
AP. The rating is done following the approach described in
[32]. The AP levels and their mapping to the qualitative scale
for the likelihood are shown in Table V.
In New Dependable Rolling Stock for a more Sustain-
able, Intelligent and Comfortable Rail Transport in Europe
(ROLL2RAIL) project, the likelihood, presented in Table VII
was determined by estimation, because the lack of information
about actual conducted attacks on similar systems does not
allow calculating the AP.
C. Unmitigated security risk calculation
The unmitigated cybersecurity risk is determined by means
of the risk matrix, presented in Table VI, which was defined
specifically for the TCMS cybersecurity risk assessment within
the ROLL2RAIL project [34]. The risk matrix is used to
calculate the resulting level of risk (Likelihood x Impact) and
to identify whether it is acceptable or not. In railway systems,
a risk is considered as unacceptable in case its level is major or
critical, and as acceptable in case its level is minor or negligible
[34].
The risk matrix also helps in the suggestion of mitigation
solutions. In fact, the countermeasures should be deployed in
a way to reduce the threat likelihood but never the impact
that it could have in the system. As such, if a threat poses an
unacceptable risk, we must move in the matrix to the nearest
TABLE I: Impact Analysis for External Door Control functionality (With Train Lines Safety functions)
Threat Threat Threat Description Asset Cascading effects
class ID
PT01 Vandalism An attacker could unplug the Access Point from the network
or power-off the access point
On-Board Com-
munication Net-
work
DMI is not able to receive information about doors status. The driver cannot receive
information from DMI to ensure that doors are in the right status (such as to verify
that all doors are closed before start moving). The driver is not able to command door
system, the commands are blocked at the (TDCU- CDCU) level (at the wired level).
This also means that the other consists can be out of the control. As such, for safety
reasons, the train Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out of the train until
the doors are opened manually.
PT02 Vandalism An attacker could damage door sensors Door sensors The door control system can not know the state of the concerned door. The damaged
door is locked and cannot be used until it is opened manually.
PT03 Unauthorized physical
access/ Unauthorized
entry to premises
An unauthorized person controls the doors of the train by
direct manipulation of the DMI
DMI If the attacker tries to open a door, the Train Line locks it and does not allow opening
it when the train is moving. If he tries to send continuously “close” commands to the
door so the passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
PT04 Unauthorized physical
access/ Unauthorized
entry to premises
An unauthorized person can manipulate the door control
system through TDCU Crew interface.
TDCU Crew In-
terface
If the attacker tries to open a door, the Train Line locks it and does not allow opening
it when the train is moving. If he tries to send continuously “close” commands to the
door so the passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
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PT05 Unauthorized physical
access/ Unauthorized
entry to premises
An unauthorized person can manipulate the door control
system through CDCU Crew interface.
CDCU Crew In-
terface
If the attacker tries to open a door, the Train Line locks it and does not allow opening
it when the train is moving. If he tries to send continuously “close” commands to the
door so the passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
PT06 Unauthorized physical
access/ Unauthorized
entry to premises
An unauthorized person can manipulate the door control
system through DCU Crew interface.
DCU Crew In-
terface
If the attacker tries to open a door, the Train Line locks it and does not allow opening
it when the train is moving. If he tries to send continuously “close” commands to the
door so the passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
PT07 Unauthorized physical
access/ Unauthorized
entry to premises
An attacker could damage the DMI DMI The door control system cannot be controlled through DMI. Door control services are
inaccessible for the driver. Doors can not be remotely controlled by the driver. In such
circumstances,doors are locked by the Train Line and cannot be used until it is opened
manually.
UD08 Erroneous use or ad-
ministration of devices
and systems
An employee may accidentally enter erroneous use or bad
administration of door control system in the maintenance
phase.
EDC system A bad or erroneous administration and configuration of the system may lead to erroneous
actions and/or improper monitoring commands. In this case, the whole door control
system could stop working, doors could be blocked at their current status. The train
cannot move until the door control system is fixed. Such incident may also lead to
increase cyber-physical vulnerabilities of the systems and create entrance points for
other potential threats.
UD09 Using information
from an unreliable
source
Erroneous configuration,installation or maintenance data may
be used from unreliable sources
EDC system This can lead to malfunctioning of the door control system or stopping it completely.
Doors could be blocked. The train cannot move until the door control system is fixed.
Such incident may also lead to increase cyber-physical vulnerabilities of the systems
and create entrance points for other potential threats.
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UD10 Unintentional change
of data in the sys-
tem or destruction of
records
recorded data about the state of the system may be changed
or deleted
EDC system The system usually records data about system functioning at the aim to using them not
only for maintenance purposes, but also to strengthen the system against the problems
and incidents occurring during operation. such incident leads to loss of operational data.
FM11 Failure of device or
systems
In case of a hardware failure in DMI and/or TDCU, the driver
is not able to command the whole door system. For TDCU
crew interface hardware failure, the crew is not able to isolate
specific consist from door operation. In the both cases, the
failure is at the train level.
DMI, TDCU
and/or TDCU
crew interface
The train Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out the train until the doors
are opened manually.
FM12 Failure of device or
systems
In case of a hardware failure in CDCU, the driver is not
able to command the door system at the concerned consist.
For CDCU crew interface hardware failure, the crew is not
able to lock or release doors in specific vehicle of the consist
concerned.
CDCU and/or
CDCU crew
interface
The system may be locally affected, doors at the failed consist cannot be controlled.
The train Line locks the doors of the a ected consist. The passengers cannot go out the
consist until the doors are opened manually.
FM13 Failure of device or
systems
Hardware failure: DCU and/or DCU crew interface DCU and/or
DCU crew
interface
The door connected to the failed DCU fails. The train Line locks the affected door. The
door cannot be used until it is opened manually
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FM14 Failure or disruption of
communication links
Software or Hardware failure On-Board com-
munication net-
work
No data exchange. DMI can not receive any information about doors status. The driver
cannot receive information from DMI to ensure that all doors are closed before start
moving as such the train cannot move. Commands are also blocked at DMI-TDCU
level, the driver is not able to command the door system. For safety reasons, the train
Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are
opened manually.
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E O15 Network outage Outage of cable or wireless network On-Board com-
munication net-
work
No data and monitoring commands exchange between door control system entities. DMI
cannot receive any information about doors status. The driver cannot receive information
from DMI to ensure that all doors are closed before start moving as such the train
cannot move. Commands are also blocked at DMI-TDCU level, the driver is not able
to command the door system. In case the train is moving, the driver is also unable to
command the door system, as such, for safety reasons, The train Line locks the doors.
The passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
E16 Network
Reconnaissance,
Network traffic
manipulation and
Information gathering
Malicious activities my be performed at the aim to identify
information about network to find security weaknesses
On-Board com-
munication net-
work
An attacker may learn about weaknesses of the network and use them to disturb the
door control system or disconnect its assets.
E17 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker can conduct a MiTM attack, sniff the data and
command traffic exchanged between different Door control
system entities. As such, he can reveal content of door
command and status messages (on train level)
On-Board com-
munication net-
work
Operational information could be released.
E18 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send a falsified door command on the train
level (to the TDCU)
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - TDCU
The Train Line locks the doors and does not allow opening them when the train is
moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously “close” commands to the door so the
passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
E19 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send falsified door status information to DMI
and/or TDCU. The driver receive an erroneous information
about door status.
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - DMI -
TDCU
The driver receives a false doors open signalisation, as such he cannot move the train
until the DMI notify him that all doors are closed.
E20 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send a falsified door command on the consist
level (to the CDCU)
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - CDCU
The Train Line locks the doors and does not allow opening them when the train is
moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously “close” commands to the door so the
passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
E21 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send falsified door status information to
CDCU (on consist level). The driver receive an erroneous
information about door status at the attacked consist.
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - CDCU
The driver receives a false information about the doors of the attacked consist are
opened, as such he cannot move the train until the DMI notify him that all doors are
closed.
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E22 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send a falsified information about actual
train/consist composition, or actual train backbone status to
TDCU or CDCU (such as erroneous train orientation)
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - TDCU -
CDCU
The Train Line locks the doors to not allow opening external doors from the wrong
side in the station. If the attacker tries to send continuously “close” commands to the
door so the passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
E23 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send a falsified door command on the
individual door level (to the DCU)
On-Board com-
munication net-
work - DCU
The Train Line locks the doors and does not allow opening them when the train is
moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously “close” commands to the door so the
passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
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E24 Man in the middle /
Session hijacking
An attacker may send falsified information about train speed to
DCU. The doors can be released during train movement or the
doors cannot be released when the train stops.
On-Board
communica-
tion network
- DCU
The Train Line locks the doors and does not allow opening them when the train is
moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously “close” commands to the door so the
passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
NA25 Denial of Service An Attacker can conduct Distributed Denial of network service
(DDoS) attack at the network layer using several techniques
as Protocol exploitation, Malformed packets, Flooding,Spoofing.
He can conduct a DDOS attack at the application layer us-
ing techniques like Ping of Death, XDoS, WinNuke. He can
conduct DDoS attack to both network and application services
using amplification/ reflection methods i.e. NTP, DNS .Such
type of attack aims to disconnect the network (communication
disruption) or degrade the performance of the network, to abuse
of resources, to alter network configuration or even physically
destroy or alter network components.
On-board
commu-
nication
network
DMI is not able to receive information about doors status. The driver cannot receive
information to ensure that doors are in the right status. The driver is also not able to
command door system. Door system is out of the control. As such, for safety reasons,
the train Line locks the doors. Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are
opened manually.
NA26 Malicious code/ soft-
ware/ activity
An Attacker can access to the network and inject a malicious
code, or install a malicious software to conduct a malicious ac-
tivity within the system. The attacker can use several techniques
such as abuse of resources, Worms / Trojans, Rootkits, Elevation
of privileges, Viruses, Rogue security software / Rogueware /
Scareware, Exploits/Exploit Kits
Door control
system
The malicious code or software allows for conducting malicious activities and thus
disturbing the system by altering configuration, manipulating data and monitoring
commands, disrupting services, disrupting the whole system, changing doors states
(unsafe states) or blocking them. The system can also be remotely controlled by attacker
using such techniques. If the system detects an abnormal functioning of EDC, the Train
Line locks the doors to allow opening them when the train is moving. If the attacker
tries to send continuously “close” commands to the door so passengers cannot go out
of the train until the doors are opened manually.
NA27 Identity Fraud An Attacker can conduct malicious identity theft actions. This
can be done using identity theft malicious computer programs
such as credentials- stealing trojan
Door control
system
Identity Fraud actions allow attackers to access to the door control system with
more advanced privileges such as administrator and thus allow them to commit
unauthorized activities such as unauthorised use or administration of devices and
systems, unauthorised use of software, unauthorized changes of records. If the attacker
attempts to open external doors in an appropriate conditions, the Train Line locks the
doors to not allow opening them when the train is moving. If the attacker tries to send
continuously “close” commands to the door so passengers cannot go out of the train
until the doors are opened manually.
NA28 Manipulation of hard-
ware and software
An attacker can maliciously manipulate hardware and software
components of the door control system. Such attacks are done
by taking advantages of some IT vulnerabilities, accessing to
device software (it could also be done through modifications of
code or data, attacking its integrity), or by accessing directly to
hardware
Door control
system
(Network,
software and
hardware)
Loss control of the system, all door control system components can be damaged. The
door control system is disrupted. For safety reasons, the train Line locks the doors.
Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
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NA29 Manipulation of infor-
mation
An attacker can maliciously manipulate recorded data about the
state of the system. He can also alter system configurations
Door control
system
This can lead to loss of data for maintenance and control purposes, malfunctioning of
the system in case of altering configuration data which can lead to serious problem and
endanger the safety of train and passengers. For safety reasons, the train Line locks the
doors. Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
TABLE II: Determination of Impact value
Impact Severity Description Impact
Area level Value
Safety
1 Life-threatening injuries (survival uncertain), fatal injuries
and/or extreme damage to the environment
10000
2 Severe and life-threatening injuries (survival probable) and/or
large damage to the environment
1000
3 Light and moderate injuries and/or minor damage to the envi-
ronment
100
4 No injuries 0
Financial
1 Existence-threatening financial damage and/or the incident will
incur people suing the company, severe impact to the public
image of the company
1000
2 Substantial financial damage, but yet not existence-threatening
and/or the incident may have a serious impact on the public
image of the company
100
3 Undesirable financial damage and/or the incident may have an
impact on the public image of the company
10
4 No or tolerable financial damage 0
Operational
1 Train unusable, i.e., one or more fundamental functions are
affected. The train usage is infeasible.
100
2 Service required, i.e., an important function is affected. The
train/vehicle can be used only with massive restrictions
10
3 Comfort affected. The vehicle can be used with some restric-
tions
1
4 No relevant effects, i.e., at most, an unimportant function is
affected and the train/vehicle can be used without restrictions.
0
TABLE III: Impact level
Impact Value Impact Level
0 − 2 Insignificant
3 − 21 Medium
22 − 210 Critical
> 210 Catastrophic
TABLE IV: Attack potential factors, ranges and values
AP Factor Description Range Value
Elapsed Time
The time needed by an attacker to identify a particular
potential vulnerability, to develop an attack method and to
sustain effort required to perform the attack against the target.
Hours 0
Days 1
Weeks 3
Months 7
Expertise Level of knowledge of the underlying principles, product type
or attack methods.
Layman 0
Proficient 3
Expert 6
Multiple experts 8
Knowledge of
Target
Level of target related knowledge needed to perform the
attack.
Public 0
Restricted 3
Sensitive 7
Critical 11
Access Level of access to the target system needed to perform theattack.
Unnecessary or
unlimited
0
Easy 1
Moderate 4
Difficult 10
Equipment Equipment required to identify or exploit the vulnerabilityand to perform the attack.
Standard 0
Specialized 4
Bespoke 7
Multiple bespoke 9
TABLE V: Likelihood level
AP Value AP Level Likelihood Level
0 − 9 Basic Certain
10 − 13 Enhanced Basic Likely
14 − 19 Moderate Possibly
20 − 24 High Unlikely
> 24 Beyond High Remote
“Acceptable” cell in the vertical direction. To reduce the
impact a change of the architecture of the system is necessary.
According to this risk matrix, any catastrophic impact shall
be avoided by design (introducing additional systems in the
system architecture) because independently of the likelihood
level the risk would be unacceptable.
TABLE VI: Risk matrix
Likelihood Level Risk Level
Certain Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Likely Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Possibly Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Unlikely Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Remote Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable
Insignificant Medium Critical Catastrophic
Impact Level
D. Risk evaluation
When conducting a risk assessment, impacts on the system
should be determined without any additional protection system
in order to evaluate the real consequences. For the specific
case of railway systems, the train operates necessarily with an
additional protection control called Train Lines. Train Lines
consists of a set of safety functions that aims to protect the
train especially in case of abnormal functioning.For example,
for EDC, Train Lines system adds doors locking and releasing
functions which reduces considerably impacts of the system
malfunctioning and especially avoid catastrophic ones.
In the context of ROLL2RAIL, we evaluated impacts of
cyber-physcial threats identified in step 2, on the system for
both cases; with and without Train Lines safety functions. We
started by studying impacts and consequences with Train Lines
safety functions transparent. We noticed that all impacts are
evaluated critical or catastrophic (mostly catastrophic). These
catastrophic impacts according to the risk matrix, presented
in Table VI, cannot be avoided independently the likelihood
of the threat. Therefore, the only way to avoid this case is to
change the evaluated architecture by taking into account the
existence of Train Lines. As such, for the current analysis,
we are conducting the security risk assessment including the
Train Lines, therefore reducing the impact of security threats
and making able to set these threats in an acceptable risk level
by introducing new countermeasures in the SuC. Likewise,
the impacts presented in Table I are also identified with
consideration of Train Lines safety functions.
TABLE VII: Risk Analysis for External Door Control func-
tionality With Train Lines Safety
Threat Impact Severity Impact Resulting Impact Likelihood Risk
ID Area Value Impact Value Level Level Level
PT01
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
PT02
Safety 4 0
1 Insignificant UnlikelyFinancial 4 0
Operational 3 1
Acceptable
PT03
Safety 4 0
20 Medium PossiblyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
PT04
Safety 4 0
20 Medium PossiblyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
PT05
Safety 4 0
20 Medium PossiblyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
PT06
Safety 4 0
20 Medium PossiblyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
PT07
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
UD08
Safety 4 0
100 Critical UnlikelyFinancial 4 0
Operational 1 100
Unacceptable
UD09
Safety 4 0
100 Critical PossiblyFinancial 4 0
Operational 1 100
Unacceptable
UD10
Safety 4 0
100 Critical UnlikelyFinancial 4 0
Operational 1 100
Unacceptable
FM11
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
FM12
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
FM13
Safety 4 0
1 Insignificant PossiblyFinancial 4 0
Operational 3 1
Acceptable
FM14
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
O15
Safety 4 0
20 Medium UnlikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Acceptable
E16
Safety 4 0
100 Critical LikelyFinancial 2 100
Operational 4 0
Unacceptable
E17
Safety 4 0
100 Critical LikelyFinancial 2 100
Operational 4 0
Unacceptable
E18
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E19
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E20
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E21
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E22
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E23
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
E24
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
NA25
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
NA26
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
NA27
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
NA28
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
NA29
Safety 4 0
20 Medium LikelyFinancial 3 10
Operational 2 10
Unacceptable
Table VII presents the risk evaluation of threats previously
studied in section V-A. From the impact-likelihood combina-
tion for each unwanted incident, the risk level can be calculated
and identified whether it is acceptable or not following the risk
matrix presented in Table VI. In case the risk is unacceptable,
countermeasure should be applied in order to reduce the
likelihood of the corresponding threats.
VI. GOOD PRACTICES
According to the methodology presented in section II, at
this level of the risk assessment, we should identify a set of
countermeasure with the aim to eliminate unacceptable risks.
However, these countermeasures cannot be presented as their
are classified. Instead, in this paper, we presents high level
countermeasures, sort of good practices that helps to design
a properly protected TCMS. In Table VIII, we present a first
estimation about time and efforts needed to recover from an
unwanted incident, some good practices that helps to avoid
exposure of the system to the identified threats or to limit
their impacts, and the existent challenges and gaps that may
increasing vulnerability and exposure of the system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a security risk assessment
of EDC system of Train Control and Monitoring System
(TCMS). This work was conducted as a part of ROLL2RAIL
project. The security risk analysis showed that the absolute
majority of threats targets mainly integrity and availability
of the EDC system which can lead to severe consequences.
Regarding data confidentiality, this security property is not of
huge impact for EDC system. During ROLL2RAIL project,
the security risk assessment was conducted for others func-
tionalities of TCMS. At the end, a set of countermeasures was
proposed to strengthen the security of TCMS against identified
potential threats. The effectiveness of the countermeasures
was demonstrated through several iterations of risk evaluation
process.
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